ANADIANS used to be rather complacent about international problems. We were happy that we had no axe to grind in world affairs, and flattered ourselves that our remoteness and disinterestedness endowed us with superior wisdom concerning them. Canadian envoys at Geneva habitually bored their listeners in the Assembly of the League of Nations by smug admonitions to follow the noble example of Canada's undefended frontier, assuming naively that it is really comparable with typical international frontiers.
day to day? Are some of us still inclined to assume our right to a future that will be easy, painless, and profitable?
In too many quarters the notion persists that our present acceptance of responsibility in international affairs is exceptional and that Canada's normal role, to be reverted to as soon as possible after the war, is that of a passive beneficiary of acceptable world conditions provided by others. Perhaps there are some nations that can flourish in such a role, but it is time for Canadians to recognize that no such role is any longer possible for Canada. If this nation is to prosper, if indeed it is to survive, it can do so only by playing a constructive and responsible part in world affairs.
That our former attitudes are no longer appropriate is obvious if one looks at present facts. During this war Canada has become the third trading nation of the world, and among the United Nations she ranks fourth in the production of war supplies, third in sea-power, and fourth in air-power. In the councils of the United Nations, while not ranked with the Big Four (or "in due course" Five, including France), Canada nevertheless sits as an equal member with Britain and the United States on the Combined Production and Resources Board and the Combined Food Board. In UNRRA she has played a conspicuous part in shaping the organization and her contribution to its work promises to be of especial value.
Again, we must emphasize her share in the pool of scientific research out of which has come so much to advance the techniques of war and to improve nutrition and health; and.also the effectiveness of her public administration in exchange control, price ceilings, and plans for post-war rehabilitation--matters in which in many respects Canadian achievement has become a model for other lands. In short, in effective influence as well as in power and production Canada has come to a place where she ranks nearest of the smaller powers to the Big Four and even in some ways to the Big Three. It is a reflection of this new position that our legations abroad have been multiplied and that several legations have been raised to the rank of embassies.
We start then from the fact that Canada is an effective nation, occupying a position different in some respects from that of any other. Our policies must be shaped to fit our circumstances. In their light what are the international conditions essential for our security and welfare?
We may boast of our leading place among trading nations, but if we observe how the nature of our external trade and its prominence in our economy make us dependent upon the ups and downs of economic conditions beyond our borders we may well feel perturbed rather than proud.
Already before the war Canada was so dependent upon external markets for her high standard of living that her economy was one of the most vulnerable in the world.
The war-time needs of the United Nations have created unprecedented demands for the products of our natural resources and our labour. Our own interest in the outcome of the war has impelled us to produce the utmost we can for the common war effort, even though that is greatly in excess of what we can use ourselves plus what we can sell to others.
Our billion-dollar gift to Britain and our whole Mutual Aid Policy have been a means of keeping our economy at this top production. When the war is over we may be able to turn some of the new facilities of production to our own use, but in many lines there will be a sharp limit to the possibilities of consumption at home. Hence we shall need abroad larger markets than ever, and for a greater diversity of products. If those markets are to be adequate we need a world in which there will be a reasonable degree of monetary stability and facility of international exchange; a world in which it will be 15ossible for needy countries to receive adequate international credits in order that their economies may be placed on as sound a basis as is possible for them with such natural resources, human and material, as they possess; in other words, a world in which those to whom we would sell can find the means of payment. They must also feel sufficient confidence in the future to make them welcome our goods rather than exclude them. If trade can move freely on a multilateral basis rather than be confined to bilateral barter, so much the better.
One relevant point is too often forgotten. If other countries are to welcome goods from outside their territory, we must be ready to do the same. In the long run we can sell only to the extent that we are willing to take payment in goods and in services. This truism did not trouble us while we were a debtor country, a large part of whose exports went to pay interest charges on capital formerly imported to develop our resources, our transportation systems, and our industry. After the war we shall be a creditor country, except in relation to the United States. We have still to find whether American policy will make it possible for us rapidly to pay off our indebtedness in that quarter, but in any case we seem unlikely to let it increase greatly. During the war we have not accepted Lend-Lease.
In our post-war need for markets we may find reason to regret the extent to which we have repatriated Canadian securities formerly held in Britain, for if our exports to Britain are to be maintained at their former level we shall have to enlarge our imports to balance virtually the whole of our exports, including that part of them which formerly went to meet interest charges. It is fortunate that our Canadian type of Mutual Aid precludes the possibility of demanding future payments from abroad to balance a Mutual Aid Account.
We shall want all that comes in to be available as payment for current exports. We shall have to be prepared to buy abroad freely.
To some extent we can secure outlets for exports after the war by extending the principle of free contribution. Our part in UNRRA goes a small distance in that direction. But in the long run distressed and backward countries must remain recipients of charity only while it is helping them to their feet. Once there, they will need opportunity to sell their goods in return for what they receive if their economy is to prosper. In other words, the world must open its markets to them. For a time, too, we can find export openings by lending abroad, but that merely postpones the day when we must accept a return flow and in fact must see it expanded by the income on our foreign holdings.
Our interest in international stabilization of money and exchange, and in seeing international credits provided on an international basis, appears in our participation in the discussions that have been taking place on these problems. We want to secure a world situation that will promote multilateral trade on as free a basis as possible by creating general confidence, so that nations will not need to maintain excessive barriers to protect their own production. But we must not forget that if that is what we want we have to be parties to such a policy, not merely its beneficiaries. So much, then, for Canada's economic dependence upon world conditions. Her position is hardly less vulnerable in the matter of security. It was all very well to be complacent about our security when we thought of ourselves as insulated from distant areas of international conflict by British sea-power and as living on the fringe of an isolationist hemisphere whose protective mantle, the Monroe Doctrine, could be thrown around us in case of need.
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The successful outcome of the First World War and the establishment of the League of Nations increased our confidence in our own immunity from distant dangers. In the present war, although our very survival as a free nation is at stake, Canadian territory has escaped devastation; but we are well aware that in a future general conflict we might not be so comfortable. The increasing range of attack from the air brings our soil within easy reach from the old world, but it is more fateful that we lie on the intercontinental air crossroads of the future. Another world war would find Canada the cockpit. Were ours a compact country there might be a chance of avoiding such a fate, but the extent of its coast and territory is too great. We could not pr eserve neutrality. We would have to become a party to the conflict, and then, whichever affiliation we might choose, our land would become the target of the opposing side.
In thinking of our future position we must face the hard and difficult facts of our peculiar vulnerability in terms of security as well as in terms of economics.
•
The maintenance of our national prosperity and security involves us, whether we like it or not, in a complicated international network. We cannot rely on intimate association in any one direction exclusive of others. Let us notice briefly a number of the external relationships that must be taken into account in determining Canadian policy.
A mere glance at the map reveals the intimacy of Canada's relations with the United States, especially if one remembers how near geographically are the principal centres of population and of industry in the two countries and how intertwined the development of their life has been in many respects. This intimacy will persist, and in many aspects of life it must increase.
We are occasionally irritated at some fresh reminder that there are persons in the neighbouring Republic who do not fully appreciate the differences between their national outlook and ours, persons who some times are even unaware of the existence of a genuine Canadianism which has old and vigorous roots and is still growing. But in no country does a majority of the people know very much about any other. Where the masses are literate and vocal, as in the United States, their ignorance is more apparent, and we live so close to the windows of the American house that we cannot help hearing and seeing more than is sometimes quite comfortable for us.
The really relevant fact here, and it is a fortunate one, is that the prevailing attitude in the United States towards Canada and Canadians is one of goodwill. It is goodwill which, once it is informed, promotes tolerance of our differences and a recognition that there are values for the United States as well as for Canada not only in Canada's industrial competence and growing prosperity, but also in the maintenance of a vitally Canadian national life.
Continuance of this happy focus in the American outlook is essential to our national well-being. To 'preserve it requires a reciprocal attitude on our part. It requires also something more. As the smaller power it is essential for us not only to tolerate but to understand our large neighbour's ways and purposes and, in shaping our own policies, never to forget theirs. This by no means implies that we must wait for a lead from Washington, or that if there is a difference between us we must take for granted that it is our part to yield. On the contraty we must press our views with vigour and persistence. But we can only hope to follow our own concerns along our own path and to preserve a share of influence in matters that concern us both, if we cultivate a sensitive appreciation of the interests and purposes of the United States and the attitudes of its people. This is true of all aspects of our relations as nations--economic, political, and strategic.
In the opposite direction from the United States lies Russia. Our borders do not touch, but our Arctic shores face each other across the Polar Sea. Our adjacent northern regions are sparsely peopled, but in both of them developments have begun which are likely to accelerate their pace. We can benefit from interchange of knowledge and experience concerning economic, technical, and social problems. Air transport makes us near neighbours, to become nearer as Arctic air routes are further developed.
Canada's geographic position, lying directly across the great circle routes connecting the United States and Russia, gives us an acute interest in relations between these continental powers. The situation holds awkward possibilities for us, but if we can develop in ourselves a sympathetic understanding of both peoples and in our own policies avoid the possible extremes of either, perhaps we can be at least a hostage for the growth of understanding and goodwill between them. Perhaps we can be more than that, even a useful link and intermediary. Better a mere hostage than the crossroads of conflict. During the crisis of the war the expansion of Canada's industrial contribution has been largely dependent on the situation in the United States and upon the maintenance of satisfactory economic relations across the border, but at the same time the combatant side of the Canadian war effort has been much more closely integrated with that of Britain. This has been the case both in the organization and training of our land, sea, and air forces and in their use in action. Long tradition partly accounts for this, but it has followed naturally from our joining in the war at the beginning when Britain became engaged, and from our prompt recognition that the defence of Britain and of the north Atlantic were as vital to our own security as the manning of our coast defences and the patrolling of the immediate approaches to our ports. In the light of such aspects of Canada's position as have been sketched, what should be our attitude towards the problem of world organization? What does Canada's long-range interest suggest as realistic and desirable? It may be unfortunate that we cannot hope for a world organized just as we would like it, but our problem is to exercise what influence we can in shaping international arrangements and then, having done so, to adjust ourselves as best we can to whatever shape they take.
Another distinctive element in our position is the fact that

Sharing the defence of the north Atlantic between
It is fashionable in some quarters to bemoan the fact that the Big Three have committed themselves to major responsibilities in shaping the post-war situation and in securing it against whatever challenge it may have to face. As a small power we shall find ourselves in a world dominated in a sense by the Big Three, but does not our hope for an era of peace depend in the first place on the Big Three continuing to stand together? The primary condi-tion of their doing so is that the international system which is created shall be acceptable to each of them. Such a system will not be exactly what we would choose if we could have our own way, but any system unacceptable to the great powers has no chance of being effective for security. Surely we shall not deceive ourselves, as we did after the last war, by talking of a world system if it fails to secure the adhesion of any one of the great powers. it is essential that we move only so far and so fast as we can with the participation and support of them all.
Another lesson from the last post-war attempt is the necessity of giving to those nations which have the major economic resources and the greatest armed might a power of prompt action for maintaining the security that they have done the most to win. Crucial decisions in which time is of the essence if they are to be effective cannot wait for the deliberation and assent of little and distant powers. And in the world of the future time will be of critical importance.
Some may suppose that only for the small powers is the new world going to be a difficult place. In fact, however, it is going to be so difficult for the big powers to get along together that they will need the constant aid of smaller powers in developing anything like a harmonious pattern of international organization.
The alternative to a situation in which the great powers stand together is one in which they stand separately. In the latter case every small power would be under the necessity of becoming a satellite of one or another of the big powers. Would that improve the chances of lesser powers either exercising influence upon world events or preserving their own independence? We do not want a Big Three or Big Four bloc riding roughshod over the rest of the world. Neither do we want three or four big blocs, each comprising a major power and a number of smaller powers, contending with one another in a race for power predominance. Given first of all a basic association of the Big Three or Four or Five, then the lesser powers can better make their influence felt independently on issues as they arise and will be less committed to following willy-nilly the lead of any one of the big powers.
However much the present United Nations coalition, or present proposals for its development, may fall short of the ideal, it marks a degree of international co-operation in war-time policy and action that is without precedent in the whole course of history. This gives some ground for hope that after the war also we may do better than nations have done in the past. Admittedly the unity achieved in war-time will be more difficult to maintain when victory has removed the immediate menace, but many continuing problems will be insoluble without continued unity.
We rightly assume today that where possible we shall build post-war organizations upon war-time experience and in some cases A further ground for present hope is the progress already made in developing functional international organizations for particular purposes, in which those nations in a position to contribute to the handling of a problem share in the attack upon it according to their capacity. The principle, having been found to work well for war-time needs, is being applied to post-war plans, notably in the organization of UNRRA.
The Canadian government has urged the advantages of this functional principle of organization and has helped to put it into effect. Functional organizations may in due course be linked with such general organization for security as may be created, but there is advantage in getting them going meanwhile. If we tie all aspects of international organization together in one big project, we risk the danger that rejection or failure of any one of these may pull the whole structure down. If we keep them distinct in the early stages we can move forward on many fronts even if blocked on some.
We hav, e seen that Canada among all the smaller nations occupies a place closest to the centre of United Nations councils and that she is making a contribution to the war next only after that of the great powers themselves, hence it can be expected that in shaping world organization Canada will hav. e a comparable influence. This has been happening already in more than one phase of post-war planning. Unless the opportunities o• our new middle power position turn our national head, Canada should be able to help in securing for the small powers recognition, opportunity, and influence in world organization proportionate to their deserts and Our present influence is due partly to these circumstances, as well as to the importance of our contribution to the war effort. But there is a point which ties these factors together--the significance of our entrance into the wa• by our own act, at its beginning, and as a full belligerent. That meant that our own contribution to the war effort began to count in the most critical period of the conflict, and in view of the character of American neutrality legislation our belligerency facilitated that early economic support to Britain from the United States which many Americans were eager to afford but which their own laws made difficult. We were the vanguard of this hemisphere in the war.
In short we have earned our present influence by the assumption of responsibilities. But it would be folly to imagine that we have, once and for all, earned a permanent influence. Our opportunity for influence in future will depend on the extent to which we continue to show initiative and a readiness to carry our share of responsibility.
No small power can hope to win influence or maintain it by demanding merely a recognition of its rights and status. These will be recognized not only as it accepts responsibility in theory , but as it demonstrates capacity to carry it. Indeed, a small power must expect to have to carry more than its proportionate' share, at any rate by comparison with a great power close by its border, and to do better than such a power relatively to its resources for economic and military and political action. Once it lets itself incur the charge of slacking and merely relying on others to protect it because its protection is in their interest, it forfeits the right and the opportunity of influencing their policies or of enjo. ying an effective x/oice in international organization under their leadership.
A smaller nation's influence with the great powers must rest on more than the nuisance value of its capacity to impede international progress. For years past Canada headed the procession in seeking advantages and recognition, but spurning responsibilities. We have now changed our tune and have shouldered responsibility commensurate with our resources.
This we must continue to do.
Some countries may have a chance of survival, if not of exer.-cising any notable influence, without committing themselves to a responsible position internationally. Not so Canada. For us the question is not how much influence Canada shall exercise, but whether she shall continue to have any influence at all or, in the long run, any genuine independence. Mr. King's Woodbridge speech in 1038 may be cited here. Mr. Roosevelt had said at Kingston that if Canadian soil was threatened the United States would "not stand idly by." Mr. King spoke appreciatively of this expression of neighbourly goodwill, but went on to say that Canada must make sure that her soil could not become a highway for attack on the United States by any power. Since that exchange a close co-operation of our two countries has been built. This has been possible on a basis of genuine as well as formal partnership only because Canada has consistently demonstrated her capacity for initiative and her determination to carry more than her proportionate share of this continent's war effort. The moral of this situation for the future of our relations with the United States does not need to be elaborated.
Formerly, having sought recognition of national status at Versailles on the strength of what we had done during the Great War, we reverted to a colonial willingness to leave responsibilities to others. Surely this time we shall not so quickly grasp at the shadow and avoid the substance.
We must continue to maintain a system of government with the adaptability and flexibility that ours possesses, which makes national initiative in a crisis possible, and to maintain whatever external relationships may be required for the same purpose. It may happen that in the future, as twice in the past, we shall have to take a lead for this hemisphere on matters where the United States is as vitally concerned as we are, but is prevented by its constitution and its traditions from moving with t'he same promptness. That we should continue able to do so is to the interest of the United States and of the United Nations as well as of ourselves. It is a feature of our national independence greatly to be cherished.
The independence of any power is a relative matter. Certainly no power such as Canada can hope to move in a wholly independent orbit. In some matters we must travel willingly in the orbit of the United States, but the well-nigh overpowering attractions of that centre will continue to be offset for us by relations in other This war has taught us that we must have the best general security system that can be devised, and has made it clear that in any case we are involved more than we realized both with the Commonwealth and with the United States.
To the latter we have been drawn closer in many ways. About these ways there has been so much publicity that observers have sometimes overlooked the fact that the war has also drawn us closer than ever before to Britain and the Commonwealth, no longer in a colonial or subordinate relation, but as a full partner. As already indicated, Canada's close relations with London and with Washington must not be thought of wholly in separate compartments. Canada has become one corner of a triangle in which her respective relations with Britain and with the United States and the relations of those two powers with each other are intimately interconnected. This triangle has become the central combination around which the United Nations congregate. If it is essential for wider international unity that the group of big powers hold together, it is equally essential that this triangle should remain closely integrated. Such integration requires that Canada effectively maintain her Commonwealth partnership as well as her habit of intimate good neighbourliness with the United States.
Our British connection, in other words, has not only passed beyond any colonial significance, it is also no longer to be thought of as providing us with convenient prestige and security at no cost to ourselves in normal times. It has become instead a partnership through whose living reality, along with our special relations with the United States, we find opportunity to play not merely our most conspicuous but our most fruitful part in the international field. The words used by the assembled Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth in their meeting of May, 1944, were as true of Canada as of any other part of the Commonwealth when they said, "Our system of free association has enabled us each and all to claim a full share of the common burden," and again when they said, "We believe that when the war is won and peace returns this same free association, this inherent unity of purpose, will make us able to do further service to mankind."
We have outlived the era when a perverse sensitiveness concerning status drove us into national ineffectiveness. We have outlived it partly because there is no longer a question of status to be settled. We have gained the recognition among the nations of the Commonwealth and of the world about the lack of which some of us used to be so sensitive.
But May I mention another obstacle which with some of our people serves as a distraction from facing the problem of our external relations in a responsible spirit? As a federal state we face an internal constitutional problem of seeing to it that our national government shall be able to make international commitments concerning internal matters with confidence that the division of powers between national and provincial governments •vill not block their fulfilment. At present that difficulty is suspended by virtue of the powers that accrue to the federal government in time of war. We shall have to do something about it when peace comes, but probably much less than those insist who would like to centralize and unify our national structure to a point where a totalitarian authority can be set up. If as need arises Canada cannot solve sufficiently this internal problem inherent in all federations then Canada is less than the nation we believe she is. At any rate, we cannot make this problem an excuse for retreating into the background of international society. I t is also futile to complain that the smaller powers--our own, or any other, or all together--are little likely to be able to dictate to the big powers, whatever the formal framework of international organization may become. It is folly to complain or to feelJfrustrated, merely because the whole world is not going to order itself according to Canadian preferences. It is doctrinaire and unpractical'to talk as if victory would transform men into angels. Victory will avert destruction, but it will bring no utopias. Already the news from the redeemed areas of Europe reminds us that victory brings its own pressing problems, complicated and embittered by the experiences of war. Neither nations nor individuals are going to find a world where many of their dreams can come true.
To maintain a forward direction towards larger welfare and more secure freedom is the utmost for which we can hope. And if we would contribute to' that progress we must have a mind of our own and make the most of what possibilities there are for exerting influence. We cannot assume for Canadians any innate superiority, but our history and our present position challenge us with a great opportunity.
One still occasionally hears Canadians insist in one breath on the necessity for a more forthright Canadian position that shall be only Canadian,. yet in the next breath argue that the only way for us to realize our nationhood fully is to follow in the path that certain other nations have trod and build our national tradition on something comparable with their risorgimentos and revolutions. Despite the great part that such events have played in shaping those other nations, they were not always the best but sometimes the worst possible steps by which nationhood might have been reached. We may be thankful that we have escaped them. To attempt to assimilate our national tradition to traditions derived from such birth-throes of violent division is a disservice to ourselves and to the world. Ultra-separatism as a quality of nationalism is outworn. For nations whose traditions cherish it, it is a handicap that embarrasses and burdens them.
In so far as wars have contributed to the foundations and the growth of Canada's national tradition, we may be thankful that they have been wars in which we fought as part of a larger comradeship. War's significance for us, therefore, has not been to emphasize our separateness, to shape a mould of absolute independence, but rather to reinforce that tradition of interdependence with other peoples with which our growth to nationhood within the protective aegis of the British Empire has endowed us. That we have been bred and reared in interdependence is greatly to our gain, not to our loss, as we face the future.
As a people we have been favoured by a notable heritage of freedom. We possess both material and human resources which we have learned to use to high purpose. With our advantages, if we accept the responsibilities that they entail, our future, while it will not be easy, and while it cannot be in all things successful, may be great in national achievement and in international influence. Those who best deserve the name Canadian will face that future, not with dark forebodings about their country nor with the timid wish that she should hide from responsibility and run away from difficulty, but with confidence and high courage. Canada has a demanding destiny, and if we are true to it her years of maturity will be more fruitful, even if more difficult, than the years of her youth.
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